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While the role of mutual beliefs in coordination and 
collaboration has been extensively acknowledged, the 
cognitive processes supporting their establishment are left 
unexplained or simply assumed. Notions like “public event” 
or “public announcement” usually refer to events or speech 
acts that create such mutual information states. The goal of 
this paper is to provide a formal model of the conditions 
under which mutual beliefs can be established. Agents should 
be able to perceive and reason about each other epistemic 
activities in a shared world. To express such reasoning a 
simple version of propositional dynamic logic with converse 
operator (CPDL) is adopted. 
Keywords: Mutual Belief achievement; Common 
Knowledge; Joint Attention. 
Introduction 
The notion of common or mutual belief is a widespread 
interpretive concept shared by many diverse disciplines1. 
Since the seminal work of Lewis (1969), it has been widely 
adopted as a crucial notion to explain coordination in a 
variety of social settings from discourse understanding and 
definite reference (Clark & Marshall 1981), to strategic 
reasoning in game theory (Bacharach 1992; Geanakoplos 
1992), to collaborative and group activity in AI (Grosz & 
Kraus 1996). To act effectively in these situations, it is not 
enough for a group of agents that they all believe 
something; they should also have attitudes towards the 
mental states of their peers. Consequently, the problem of 
the genesis of common belief is of fundamental importance 
for modeling social interaction between cognitive agents. 
Such genesis is often considered as related either to public 
events or to public announcements. In the former situation a 
common belief is a consequence of an event whose 
occurrence is so evident (viz. public) that agents cannot but 
recognize it as when, during a soccer match, players 
mutually believe that they are playing soccer. In the latter, 
common belief is the product of a special event that is a 
                                                           
1 While knowledge is generally considered as justified true belief 
in this paper we will adopt only the weaker belief mental attitude. 
communication process as when the referee publicly 
announces that one player is expelled. From there on each 
player believes that each other player believes and so on… 
that one of them has been expelled.  
 Intuitively, an event is considered “public” as long as its 
occurrence is epistemically accessible by everybody such 
that it becomes common knowledge between them. Such a 
definition is usually given for granted but can be explicitly 
stated as:  Public(e) ↔ (Happens(e) → CB (Happens(e))). 
 
However what are the “intuitive” conditions that make an 
event to be qualified as public?  What are the reasons to 
believe that an occurring event is commonly believed? 
To achieve a common belief, agents need to be aware of 
each other current epistemic activities (attending to, looking 
at) both at the event itself and at each other epistemic 
activities. Looking at each other (i.e. by eye contact) while 
accessing the event provides reasons to accept the mutual 
information state. Such condition is usually described as 
joint attentional state (see for instance Tomasello 1999). 
   Moving beyond traditional approaches to public 
announcements mostly focused on belief update at the group 
level (Baltag et al. 2003), in this paper first we introduce a 
propositional dynamic logic to reason about epistemic and 
pragmatic actions and beliefs. Then we advance a logic for 
perception and mutual perception that let the agents infer 
from the fact that they are jointly attending at something 
(i.e. by mutually checking whether something is true in the 
world) that a certain proposition is mutually believed by 
them. After discussing our model we conclude and point to 
future work. 
Language 
Let denumerable sets AGT = {1,…,n} of agents, Π of 
propositional symbols {p, q, r,…} and ACT of atomic 
pragmatic actions {a, b, c,…} be given. The language L is 
the smallest superset of Π such that: if ϕ, ψ ∈ L, i ∈ AGT,  
α∈ACT’ then ¬ϕ, ϕ ∨ ψ, Beliϕ, <α>iϕ, 
<O(ϕ)>iψ,<P(ϕ)>iψ, <T(ϕ)>iψ ∈L where ACT’ is the 
smallest superset of ACT such that if ϕ ∈ L and α1, α2 
α∈ACT’ then  
- α1;α2 ∈ACT’ “execute α1 then execute α2” 
- α1 ∪ α2∈ACT’ “choose either α1 or α2 
nondeterministically and execute it” 
Beliefs 
We use a modal logic KD45 as the logic for belief, i.e. an 
agent does not entertain inconsistent beliefs and is aware of 
his beliefs and disbeliefs. In the models for each agent i ∈ 
AGT and possible world w ∈ W there is an associated set of 
possible worlds Bi (w) ⊆ W where B is a mapping function 
B: W x AGT → 2W. So for every agent in AGT there is a 
modal operator Beli and Beli ϕ expressing that agent i 
believes that ϕ. The truth condition for Beli says that M, w╞ 
Beli ϕ if and only if ϕ holds in all worlds that are compatible 
with agent i’s beliefs, i.e. M, w╞ Beliϕ if and only if M, v╞ 
ϕ for every v ∈Bi (w). So, Bi is an accessibility relation that 
is serial, transitive and euclidean.  
Pragmatic Actions 
We use a simple version of CPDL (Propositional dynamic 
logic with converse operator) for modeling the action 
component. The empty action is noted Ø. To each action a 
is associated the modal operator [a] and its dual operator 
<a>. The formula [a]i ϕ reads “always ϕ is true after action a 
executed by agent i” whereas <a>iϕ reads “possibly ϕ is true 
after action a executed by agent i” (¬[a]i¬ϕ = <a>iϕ). [a]i 
false expresses that a cannot be executed by agent i. On the 
other side <a>i true expresses that a can be executed by 
agent i. In the models for each agent i ∈ AGT and possible 
world w ∈ W and pragmatic action a ∈ ACT there is an 
associated set of possible worlds r0 (i, a) (w) ⊆ W where r0 is 
a mapping function r0: W x AGT x ACT → 2W. The truth 
condition for [a]iϕ says that M, w╞ [a]iϕ if and only if ϕ 
holds in all worlds w’ that are results of action a executed 
by agent i when applied in world w2, i.e. M, w╞ [a]iϕ if and 
only if M, v╞ ϕ for every v ∈ r0 (w, i, a) (w). 
We adopt the standard axiomatic of PDL (see Harel et al. 
2000) that for our fragment is nothing but the multimodal 
logic K. We use the converse operator ¯: a program operator 
that allows a program to be “run backwards”. The mapping 
function r0 is extended to converse action by stipulating that 
r0 (w, i, a¯) = r0 (w, i, a)¯ 3. Notice that standard PDL 
already provides something that is similar to an Observe-
action (defined below): the standard test operator ?4. That 
operator is of no use here, because it is defined as [ϕ?]ψ ↔ 
(ϕ →ψ).  
                                                           
2 Notice that the semantics in dynamic logic for complex programs 
is easily defined in an inductive way. Take for instance the 
semantic for sequential composition of programs M, w╞ [α1;α2]i ϕ 
if and only if M, v╞ ϕ for every v ∈ r0 (i, α2) (r0 (i, α1) (w)). 
3 In CPDL two axioms for the converse operator are added to the 
standard PDL axiomatic: ϕ → [a]i <a¯>i α; ϕ → [a¯]i <a>i α. 
4 In standard PDL ψ? means “if ψ is true proceeds with the 
program otherwise fail”.  
Perceptual Actions  
Beyond usual pragmatic actions, for the aim of this paper 
we need to represent also a specific kind of epistemic action. 
More generally, we define epistemic actions as actions that 
are specialized for epistemic results: i.e. for the acquisition 
of knowledge or the verification (confirmation) of beliefs 
(Lorini & Castelfranchi 2004). Pure epistemic actions are 
actions that never change the state of the world; they just 
change the knowledge of the agent5. Here we are interested 
only to epistemic Actions of perceptual kind: Observe that ϕ 
(O(ϕ)), Perceive that ϕ (P(ϕ)), Test-if ϕ (T(ϕ)). We assume 
that Observe that, Perceive that and Test-if are applicable to 
all formulas defined in our language. An agent can Observe 
that (.), Perceive that (.) and Test-if (.) either state of affairs 
(propositions) or the execution of actions. In principle it is 
not possible for an agent to perceive or to observe or to test 
his own beliefs. More generally, perception of mental states 
is not admitted in the present formalism. We define: 
• Perceive that ϕ the action of perceiving some ϕ in the 
external world. Perceive that ϕ not necessarily implies that 
what the agent (for instance agent i) actually perceives (in 
this case ϕ) is true in the external world. 
• Observe that ϕ is the action of observing some ϕ in the 
external world. Observe that ϕ is the action executed by 
agent i of perceiving something “correctly” (of perceiving 
something that is true in the external world).  
An Observe that action as well as a Perceive that action has 
the following property: an agent i’s Observe that ϕ action 
(Perceive that ϕ action) cannot be perceived, observed or 
tested by another agent j nor from agent i himself.  
• Test-if ϕ is the action of testing whether ϕ is true or 
not6. A Test-if ϕ action is always the precursor of either a 
Perceive that ϕ or a Perceive that ¬ϕ action and under some 
particular conditions (when the environment is not noisy) is 
the precursor of either an Observe that ϕ action or an 
Observe that ¬ϕ action. Moreover, a Test-if ϕ action has the 
property of being perceivable, observable and testable from 
the executor and from other agents (different from the 
executor). Assuming that Test-if actions can be perceived 
can be questionable. Indeed it could seem more reasonable 
to consider Test-if actions as mental processes, without the 
assumption that they can be perceived from the external 
environment. From a cognitive point of view an agent 
perceptually tests a proposition that p if and only if he is 
matching the perceptual schema of the object designated in 
p with the sensorial stimuli and no inferential process is 
involved in the process of verification. However our present 
formalism and analysis applies to the scenarios in which the 
                                                           
5 Differently parasitic epistemic actions exploit pragmatic actions 
to achieve higher order epistemic goals and thus necessarily 
change the state of the world (see for example Kirsh & Maglio 
1994). 
6 In the present analysis the distinction between Test-whether and 
Test-what action is not considered (see Harrah 2002 for the 
distinction between What-question and Whether-question in the 
logic of Questioning). 
testing mental process has an external counterpart that is 
perceivable from the external environment (i.e. by detecting 
overt attentional shifts that can be seen as signals of this 
internal activity). We assume that the external counterpart of 
the Test-if action does not affect the dynamics of the 
environment7. As for pragmatic actions also epistemic 
actions of the perceptual kind are associated with the modal 
operator [.] and its dual operator <.>. For example, the 
formula [P(ϕ)]i ψ reads “always ψ is true after agent i has 
perceived that ϕ”. 
 
Axiomatic for Perceptual Actions and definition of Test 
if actions. In the rest of the paper we will omit a logical 
analysis of Observation actions (correct perceptions) and we 
will strictly focus on Perception and Test-if actions. The 
following logical axioms characterize perceptual actions: 
AXIOM 1.  ψ → [P(ϕ)]i ψ if ψ is objective 
AXIOM 2.  <P(ϕ)>iψ → [P(ϕ)]iψ 
Axiom 1 says that perceptual actions are actions that do not 
change the physical environment (if some ψ is true before 
the perceptual action and ψ is an objective state of the world 
then ψ is still true after that agent i has perceived that ϕ). 
Axiom 2 says that perceptual actions are deterministic (if 
possibly after that agent i perceives that ϕ, ψ is true, then 
always after that agent i perceives that ϕ, ψ is true).  
 
Introspection axiom for perception (IP) 
[P(ϕ)]i Beli<P(ϕ)¯>itrue 
 
IAP says that always after that an agent i perceives some ϕ, 
he ends up believing to have perceived ϕ8. 
 
Axiom of Restricted Perception (RP) 
RP1. [P(<P(ϕ)>jtrue) ]i false  
RP2. [P(Belj ϕ)]i false 
RP1 and RP2 respectively say that an agent i can never 
perceive what agent j (or agent i himself) perceives or what 
agent j (or agent i himself) believes.  
 
Definition of Noise/Not Noise and Test if actions 
We introduce the formula Noise (i, ϕ) which is built on the 
special binary predicate Noise(.) that relates agents to 
formulas and denotes a disjunction of all noise conditions 
for agent i’s perception of formula ϕ (Noise (i, ϕ)  = ψ1 
∨…∨ ψn)9. Moreover, we postulate the existence of a Noise 
axiom for each for agent i’s perception of formula ϕ of the 
following form. 
 
Noise axiom (NA) 10 
                                                           
7 A more fine-grained formalism should distinguish between the 
internal counterpart of a Test Action and the external one.  
8 See Del Val et al. 1997 for a similar axiom in a logic of 
perception. 
9 An alternative solution to deal with the Noise notion is based on 
the definition of Noise as a modal operator (based on the normal 
K-system of modal logic). This second solution is more 
appropriate for a semantic analysis of the Noise axiom. We leave 
this issue to further developments of the model.    
10 For the sake of simplicity, we condensate in the same definition 
the notion of Deleting Noise (Obstacle) and the notion of 
(<P(ϕ)¯>i true ∧ ¬ϕ) → Noise (i, ϕ)11 
 
This law establishes that whenever an agent has perceived 
that ϕ and ϕ is actually false then it means that there is 
Noise for agent i’s perception of formula ϕ.  
 
Definition of Test if action 
<T(ϕ)¯>i true = 
(ϕ ∧ ¬Noise (i, ϕ) → <P(ϕ)¯>i true) ∧ 
(ϕ ∧ Noise (i, ϕ)) → <P(¬ϕ)¯>i true) ∧ 
(¬ϕ ∧ ¬Noise (i, ¬ϕ)) → <P(¬ϕ)¯>i true) ∧ 
(¬ϕ ∧ Noise (i, ¬ϕ)) → <P(ϕ)¯> i true) 
 
Informally, an agent i’s Test if ϕ action is defined as the 
nondeterministic choice between having perceived ϕ or 
perceived ¬ϕ under some conditions of Noise with respect 
to ϕ (and ¬ϕ) and the actual truth value of ϕ12. 
 
Proposition 113 
<P(ϕ)¯>itrue ∧ Beli (<P(ϕ)¯>itrue → ϕ) → Beliϕ 
 
Proposition 1 says that whenever an agent i has perceived 
that ϕ and believes that if he has perceived ϕ, ϕ is 
effectively true then the agent believes that ϕ14. 
Mutual Social Perception 
The problem of Background Expectations 
As previously remarked (see Axioms RP1 and RP2), an 
agent i can never perceive (or observe) what another agent j 
perceives (or observes) while can perceive (and observe) 
that another agent j is testing something, since Test-if 
                                                                                                   
Amplificatory Noise (not perceiving what we are actually testing 
versus perceiving something that is not true in the external world). 
Moreover we do not take into account the notion of Deforming 
Noise (given a test for verifying whether ϕ or ψ is true, if the ϕ is 
true the agent perceives ψ). 
11 Notice that this axiom is equivalent to the Not-Noise axiom 
¬Noise (i, ϕ) → (<P(ϕ)¯>i true → ϕ). 
12 The expression ‘An agent i has tested if ϕ’ is equivalent to: if ϕ 
is true and there is not noise for agent i with respect to ϕ then agent 
i has perceived ϕ and, if ϕ is true and there is noise for agent i with 
respect to ϕ then agent i has perceived ¬ϕ and, if ¬ϕ is true and 
there is not noise for agent i with respect to ¬ϕ then agent i has 
perceived ¬ϕ and, if ¬ϕ is true and there is noise for agent i with 
respect to ¬ϕ then agent i has perceived ϕ. 
13 The proposition can be derived by means of standard modal 
principles of Beliefs and the Introspection Axiom for perception 
given above. 
14 The present model underlines a Belief Update Semantic that is 
close to the semantic given in Herzig & Longin (2000). The main 
idea of this belief update semantic is the following: whenever a 
given agent i has perceived that a certain action a will possibly 
happen next and the agent believes that his own perception was not 
affected by Noise, the agent updates his belief base; he “mentally” 
simulates the execution of action a in his Belief Model, discarding 
all the mental simulation-resulting states that are not connected by 
action a and accepting all the mental simulation-resulting states 
that are connected by action a.   
actions are assumed as the interface between external and 
internal world.  
However, given that an agent i can perceive that another 
agent j is testing if something is true or not, how can he 
perceive what agent j is actually testing? In fact, while agent 
j’s Test-if action can be perceived, its “object” cannot.  
We argue that for an agent i to perceive what the 
proposition-object of agent j’s test-if action is, two kinds of 
conditions are required: 
1. Indexical cues. Agent i perceives that agent j’s sensors 
are directed towards a specific region of the space S where 
several objects  O1,…, On are located. 
2. Background expectations in agent i’s mind. Once agent 
i has individuated the spatial region S, some background 
expectations are necessary for orienting the perception of 
agent i towards the predicted object of agent j’s test, for 
making agent i able to establish which object among O1,…, 
On is pointed by agent j. Assuming that the reference object 
is a propositional atom p, we can state that: if an agent i 
perceives that another agent j is testing if p is true or not 
then agent i had some previous background expectation that 
drove his own perception.  
The following statement makes explicit the kind of 
background expectation that could be involved in the 
perception of other agent’s tests:  
 
Background Expectation Axiom  
[P(<T(p)>jtrue)¯ ]i Beli <T(p)>jtrue 
 
The statement says that if an agent i has perceived agent j’s 
Test-if action (with respect to p) then agent i was expecting 
(before perceiving it) an agent j’s Test-if action (with 
respect to p)15.  
The problem of the “undistinguished Test” 
Imagine two agents i and j interacting in a physical 
environment. Agent i has already perceived agent j looking 
at a certain region of the space S that “contains” a number of 
objects (propositions p, q, r etc…). On the basis of indexical 
cues and background expectations agent i has disambiguated 
the situation. Agent i infers that agent j has tested whether p 
is true or not (according to agent i, p is relevant for agent j). 
Now agent i turns his sensors towards agent j’s sensors and 
agent j does the same. Each agent has his sensors directed 
towards the sensors of the others.  
We argue that at this level a 3 phases process must be 
understood. The process is completely independent from the 
                                                           
15 It seems reasonable that different kinds of background 
expectations and beliefs could be identifiable at this level. For 
instance, we could require that the necessary and sufficient 
condition for specifying the object Oi  (the proposition p) of a Test-
if action of another agent is not expecting (before perceiving the 
Test-if action) that the object of the Test-if action will not be Oi (the 
tested proposition will not be p). This is a weaker condition that 
the one given in the Background Expectation Axiom.  
Moreover, Agent i’s perception of agent j’s Test-if action can also 
be driven by some background belief concerning agent j’s 
intentions and goals (“agent j intends to test whether p is true or 
not”, “agent j wants to test whether p is true or not”). 
agent i’s perception of agent j’s epistemic activity on the 
external world that has been described above.  
1. According to agent i proposition p is relevant for agent 
j and according to agent i agent j believes that proposition p 
is relevant for agent i. 
2. The beliefs specified at point 1 (agent i believes that p 
is relevant for agent j and the belief that agent j believes that 
p is relevant for agent i) give to agent i the reasons for 
believing that agent j has directed his sensors towards agent 
i’s sensors in order to check the epistemic activity of agent i 
with respect to p.  
3. Agent i cannot identify which kind of Test-if action 
concerning p  (at which level of nesting) agent j has 
executed.  
When agent i perceives that agent j is doing some testing 
activity on agent i’s testing activity with respect to p, he will 
not be able to specify at which level of nesting agent j is 
actually testing the testing activity of agent i with respect to 
p. “Is he actually testing whether I test whether p is true or 
not? Or is he actually testing whether I test whether he tests 
whether p is true or not? Or is he actually testing whether I 
test whether he tests whether I test whether p is true or not? 
… and so on. The following axiom describes the previous 
reasoning: 
Axiom of undistinguished Test (UTA) 
(<P(<T(<T(ϕ)¯>i true)¯>j true)¯>i true ↔ 
(<P(<T(<T(<T(ϕ)¯>jtrue)¯>itrue)¯>jtrue)¯>i true 
 
Axiom UTA says that if an agent i has perceived a 2-order 
Test of agent j on the ϕ-testing activity of agent i then agent 
i has perceived a 3-order Test of agent j on agent i testing 
activity on the ϕ-testing activity of agent i 
(Indistinguishability Relation). Given any formula ϕ, the 
axiom can be extended to cover all Indistinguishability 
Relations between 2-order Tests of the other agent and n-
order tests of the other agent. The axiom states that 
whenever agent i has evaluated ϕ to be relevant for agent j 
and he has attributed to agent j the belief that ϕ is relevant 
for agent i, and he has perceived agent j’s sensors directed 
towards agent i’s sensors, he cannot establish at which level 
agent j is actually testing agent i’s testing activity with 
respect to formula ϕ. All nested tests are in fact realized by 
the same physical action. From a phenomenological 
perspective, a n-order agent j’s test-if action on agent i’s 
epistemic activity and a (n-m)-order agent j’s test-if action 
(for m < n) on agent i’s epistemic activity cannot be 
distinguished by agent i. 
Implementation of Mutual Belief via Mutual 
Perception 
Before presenting the main result of this section a further 
axiom is necessary. Notice that the following axiom is given 
with respect to the special predicate Noise(.) introduced 
above.  
 
Axiom of of Noise/Not-Noise Equivalence for nested 
Tests (NET) 
a. Not-Noise(i,<T(<T(ϕ)¯>i true)¯>j true) → 
    Not-Noise(i,<T(<T(<T(ϕ)¯>j true)¯>i true)¯>j true) 
b. Noise(i,<T(<T(ϕ)¯>i true)¯>j true) → 
    Noise(i,<T(<T(<T(ϕ)¯>j true)¯>i true)¯>j true) 
 
The two axioms establish that if there is (not) Noise for 
agent i with respect to agent j’s test on agent i’s test if ϕ 
then there is (not) Noise for agent i with respect to agent j’s 
test on agent i’s test on agent j’s test  if ϕ. We argue that the 
two axioms are reasonable because at a given moment 2-
level tests, 3-level tests, n-level tests (from j’s sensors to i’s 
sensors) are physically realized in the same way and their 
conditions of Noise (with respect to the same agent) are 
equivalent. Let us now establish the following theorem: 
 
Theorem of Mutual Belief Implementation  
 
<P(<T(<T(p)¯>i true)¯>j true)¯>i true ∧ 
∧ k>1 (BeliBelj)k (Not-Noise(i,<T(<T(p)¯>i true)¯>j true) 
∧ Not-Noise (j, <T(<T(p) ¯>j true)¯>i true)) ∧ 
∧ k>0(BeliBelj)kBeli(Not-Noise(i,<T(<T(p)¯>itrue)¯>jtrue) 
∧ Not-Noise (j, <T(<T(p)¯>j true)¯>i true)) →  
(∧ k>1(BeliBelj)kp∧ k>0(BeliBelj)kBeli p) 
 
The theorem establishes the sufficient conditions for 
guaranteeing the implementation of nested beliefs (from 
level 3 to level n) in the mind of agent i16. Extending the 
result of the theorem to the 2-agents case we obtain the 
sufficient conditions for implementing the infinite 
conjunctive chain of nested beliefs (from level 3 to level n) 
that constitutes the structure of a Mutual Belief that p.  
The sufficient conditions are the following: 
1. an agent i’s perception of a 2-order Test of agent j on 
the p-testing activity of agent i and an agent j’s perception 
of a 2-order Test of agent i on the p-testing activity of agent 
j; 
2. a mutual belief that there is not noise for agent i with 
respect to his perception (specified in condition 1) and a 
mutual belief that there is not noise for agent j with respect 
to his perception (specified again in condition 1). 
Provided that both agent i and agent j enter in the mutual 
perception already holding the belief that p and the belief 
that the other believes that p, the conditions specified in the 
theorem are sufficient for guaranteeing the full 
implementation of a mutual belief that p (nested beliefs 
from level 1 to level n). 
Discussion 
Although, several authors have discussed the problem of 
mutual belief achievement, the seminal contribution of 
Lewis (1969) is still accepted. Recently Cubitt & Sugden 
                                                           
16 The formal proof of the theorem is not given in this paper. The 
proof is by induction and is based on standard modal principles of 
Beliefs, the Introspection Axiom for perception, the Noise Axiom, 
the  Axiom of undistinguished Test and the Axiom of Noise/Not-
Noise Equivalence for nested Tests. 
(2003) have proposed a complete formalization. Let us here 
introduce Lewis’ conditions in a really simplified way 
within our formalism.  
Condition 1. For all agents i: Beli A 
Condition 2. For all agents i: Beli (A → Belj A) 
Condition 3. For all agents i: Beli (A → p) 
Condition 4. For all agents i,j and for all propositions y:  
Beli (A → y) → Beli Belj (A → y). 
A is defined as the reflexive common indicator that p: A is 
responsible for the generation of higher-order beliefs in the 
mutual belief structure. Condition 1 and 2 are the conditions 
of public announcement, i.e. if A is true then all agents 
believes A, for all agents i if agent i believes that A holds 
then all other agents believe that A holds.  Condition 4 is 
very close to the property that Lewis states as ‘suitable 
ancillary premises regarding our rationality, inductive 
standards, and background information”: all agents believe 
to share the same inductive standards, i.e. for all 
propositions y and for all agents if agent i believes that A 
implies y then agent i believes that agent j believes that A 
implies y. We think that Conditions 1,2 and 4 do not hold in 
all interaction contexts. Even assuming that all agents 
believe that A is true, there are cases in which not all agents 
in the community believe that the other agents believe that 
A. On the other side there are cases in which agents do not 
believe to have the same inductive standards. Take for 
example the case where the state of affairs A is “the alarm 
goes off” and where the proposition p is “there is a fire in 
the building”. Moreover, assume that agent i perceives that 
the “the alarm goes off”. We think that it is quite 
problematic to assume that in this context agent i holds the 
belief that all agents in the building will perceive the alarm 
and to assume that agent i holds the belief that all agents in 
the building believe that “alarm” means “fire in the 
building”. Indeed it is not so obvious to assume that 
conditions 2 and 4 are holding in this situation. An analysis 
of what makes an event public is missing at this point. Were 
the other agents attending at the state of affairs A (“the 
alarm goes off”) that I have perceived? “Are the other 
agents sharing my same knowledge? (“Does everybody 
know that alarm means fire in the building”?). To interpret 
the example with our model we substitute condition 2 and 4 
given by Lewis with the notion of Mutual Perception. Take 
for instance the 2 agents case and focus on agent’s i 
reasoning and epistemic activity: 1) agent i believes that 
“the alarm goes off”; 2) agent i believes that agent j believes 
that “the alarm goes off”; 3) agent i believes that agent j 
believes that “alarm means fire”, 4) agent i perceives that 
agent j is testing whether “the alarm goes off” or not in 
order to verify whether “there is a fire in the building” or 
not17, 5) agent i perceives agent j directing his sensors 
towards agent i’s sensors in order to check the epistemic 
activity of agent i with respect to “the alarm goes off” (and 
                                                           
17 A background belief allows agent i to disambiguate the 
epistemic activity of agent j. Agent i believes that the fact “there is 
fire in the building” is relevant for agent j. 
indirectly for checking the epistemic activity of agent i with 
respect to “there is a fire in the building”)18. Assume that 1, 
2, 3, 4 and 5 hold also for agent j. If we add to 1,2,3,4 and 5 
for i and j the Mutual Belief that “there is not noise for 
agent i and j with respect to the state of affairs ‘the alarm 
goes off’ ”, we achieve (on the basis of the theorem of 
Mutual Belief Implementation) the Mutual belief that “the 
alarm goes off” and given the shared rule “alarm means 
fire” the full achievement of the Mutual Belief that “there is 
a fire in the building”. We want to suggest in this work that 
an analysis of mutual perception scenarios is needed in 
order to understand how mutual belief can be achieved in a 
community of agents. An analysis of agents’ reasoning 
about shared conditions of Noise should be included at this 
level. This kind of approach would provide a specification 
of the social context features that potentially guarantee the 
implementation of the mutual belief. This approach is very 
close to the one of Clark & Marshall (1981) who advanced 
the simultaneity assumption19 and the attention assumption20 
as bases for mutual belief implementation.  
Conclusion 
 In this paper, we have discussed the conditions that 
guarantee the achievement of mutual belief in a community 
of agents. Mutual perception has been addressed as a 
fundamental process for understanding how knowledge gets 
shared. We have decomposed the notion of public 
announcement by trying to individuate the conditions that 
make either the realization of a natural event or the 
realization of an action or the truth of a state of affairs 
mutually believed. The theorem of mutual belief 
implementation represents the formal result that makes 
explicit those conditions. In the theorem the condition of 
“mutual belief that the environment is not noisy for all the 
agents in the community” is required for the implementation 
of the mutual belief that p. This result is in accordance with 
the well-known theorem by Fagin et al. (1995) stating that 
“if the communication channel is noisy (and there is mutual 
belief about that) no communication protocol can guarantee 
mutual knowledge achievement”. However our condition is 
even stronger. Our future work will be devoted to prove the 
Impossibility Theorem saying that “if there is not mutual 
belief about the reliability of the channel (Not Noise) then 
there is not communication protocol that guarantees mutual 
belief achievement”. 
                                                           
18 Together with the background belief given at point 2 an 
additional background belief is operating at this level: agent i 
believes that agent j believes that the fact “there is fire in the 
building” is relevant for agent i. 
19 Agent i sees that agent j has his eyes open and is looking 
simultaneously at her and object in the world. That is, she has 
evidence that she and the other are looking at each other and the 
object simultaneously. 
20 Agent i assumes that Agent j is not only looking at her and the 
object, but also attending to them. 
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